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WATER GOVERNANCE IN HAITI: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
LAWS AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES° 
 
Ryan B. Stoa* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Republic of Haiti struggles to sustainably manage its water 
resources.  Public health is compromised by low levels of water supply, 
sanitation, and hygiene, and water resources are often contaminated and 
unsustainably allocated.  While poor governance is often blamed for these 
shortcomings, the laws and institutions regulating water resources in Haiti 
are poorly understood, especially by the international community.   This 
study brings together and analyzes Haitian water laws, assesses institutional 
capacities, and provides a case study of water management in northern Haiti 
in order to provide a more complete picture of the sector.  Funded by the 
Inter-American Development Bank as part of the Water Availability, 
Quality and Integrated Water Resources Management in Northern Haiti 
(HA-T1179) Project, this study took place from January-July 2015, with the 
help of local experts and participating stakeholders.  The results indicate 
that Haiti’s water law framework is highly fragmented, with overlapping 
mandates and little coordination between ministries at the national level, 
and ambiguous but unrealistic roles for subnational governments.  A 
capacity assessment of institutions in northern Haiti illustrates that while 
local stakeholders are engaged, human and financial resources are 
insufficient to carry out statutory responsibilities.  The findings suggest that 
water resources management planning should engage local governments 
and community fixtures while supplementing capacities with national or 
international support.   
 
 
 
                                                 
°
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In October 2014, Florida International University (FIU) initiated a 27-
month program to analyze water challenges in Haiti.  Sponsored by the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the program has four primary 
objectives: 1) to analyze Haitian water laws and policies, and the 
institutions that implement them; 2) to identify gaps in hydrological data; 3) 
to model future risk scenarios for the Trou-du-Nord watershed; and 4) to 
create a water management plan for the Caracol Industrial Park and the 
Trou-du-Nord watershed.   
This study represents the first of the project’s objectives.  It is intended 
to fill the gap of existing knowledge on water laws, policies, and institutions 
in Haiti, as well as to provide an assessment of issues, challenges, and 
opportunities for reform.  An assessment of institutional capacities in the 
Trou-du-Nord watershed in northern Haiti provides a case study of the 
complex and multi-layered challenges faced by water managers in the 
region, and will serve as a guide for the Caracol Industrial Park’s water 
management plan.   
The results of this study were presented to stakeholders in the Trou-du-
Nord watershed, as well as national ministries, NGOs, and 
intergovernmental organizations, in June 2015.  The workshops validated 
preliminary results, while making clarifications and providing important 
insights that contributed to the final analyses presented below.  Research 
and development efforts world-wide are not possible without meaningful 
stakeholder participation; this study is no exception.  In this introductory 
section, the scope of Haiti’s water resources management challenges is 
broadly outlined, as well as prior efforts to analyze laws and institutional 
capacities that provide context to the results of this study that follow. 
 
A.  The Water and Governance Context in Haiti 
Haiti has the lowest rates of access to improved water supply and 
sanitation facilities in the western hemisphere.1  In 2002 Haiti was ranked 
last in the global Water Poverty Index,2 and according to World Health 
Organization data, it is the only country in the world whose access to 
sanitation facilities decreased from 1995-2010.3  Those figures likely 
understate the situation considering the devastating impact of the 2010 
                                                 
1
 Richard Geltin et al., Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Haiti: Past, Present, and 
Future, 89 Am. J. Trop. Hyg. 665 (2013).  
2
 Peter Lawrence, Jeremy Meigh & Caroline Sullivan, Water Poverty Index: an 
International Comparison, 11 Keel Econ. Research Papers (2002). 
3
 World Health Organization: Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation: 2012 
Update, 39-55 (2012). 
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earthquake near Port au Prince, Haiti’s capital and largest city.  Critical 
infrastructure (e.g., hospitals, roads, seaports, airports, sewage systems, 
water treatment facilities) was destroyed, and the United States Agency for 
International Development estimates that 1.5 million people were displaced 
into some 1,500 camps.4  A 2014 survey found that 74% of families forced 
to leave their homes in 2010 still considered themselves displaced, even 
though they no longer lived in displacement camps.5  From a governance 
perspective, the earthquake also had the effect of shifting Haiti’s water 
management priorities from long-term development to emergency 
response.6  These conditions were exacerbated by an unexpected cholera 
epidemic that hospitalized thousands and killed over 700.7  Water for 
domestic human needs has been, and continues to be, a pressing demand 
that remains unfulfilled. 
Other sectors suffer from an acute lack of sustainably managed water 
resources as well.  The Water Poverty Index ranked Haiti last in the world 
on environmental indicators, a measure which includes water quality, water 
stress, water management capacity, information, and biodiversity.8  Haiti’s 
water management landscape is dominated by small-scale agriculture, a 
water-intensive industry which by 2013 accounted for more than half of 
Haiti’s labor force, eighty percent of total water withdrawals, and almost 
two-thirds of Haiti’s land area.9  Agricultural expansion has fostered 
widespread deforestation, which in turn leads to soil erosion, water quality 
degradation, drought vulnerabilities and flooding hazards, and habitat 
destruction.10  Today less than two percent of land area in Haiti is 
                                                 
4
 Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance: Haiti – Earthquake Fact Sheet #10 
(2011). 
5
 Megan Bradley, Four Years After the Haiti Earthquake, the Search for Solutions to 
Displacement Continues, (2014) (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-
front/posts/2014/01/12-haiti-earthquake-anniversay-bradley. 
6
 See supra note 1, at reference 1. 
7
 David A. Walton M.D., M.P.H. & Louise C. Ivers, M.D., M.P.H., Responding to 
Cholera in Post-Earthquake Haiti, 364 N. Engl. J. Med. 3 (2011); See also, Matthew 
Smallman-Raynor, Andrew Cliff & Anna Barford, Geographical Perspectives on Epidemic 
Transmission of Cholera in Haiti October 2010 – March 2013, Annals of the Ass’n. of 
Am. Geographers, ISSN 0004-5608 (2015); Jocelyn M. Widmer et al., Water Related 
Infrastructure in a Region of Post-Earthquake Haiti: High Levels of Fecal Contamination 
and Need for Ongoing Monitoring, 91 Am. J. Trop. Med. Hyg. 790 (2014); and Andrea 
Rinaldo et al., Reassessment of the 2010-2011 Haiti Cholera Outbreak and Rainfall-driven 
Multiseason Projections, 109 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 6602 (2012). 
8
 See supra note 2, at 14. 
9
 United Nations: Food and Agriculture Organization, Geography, Climate and 
Population (Aug. 2, 2015), www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/hti/index.stm. 
10
 See Richard M. Foxx, Te Terre a Fatige ‘The Earth is Tired’: Reversing 
Deforestation in Haiti, 27 Behav. Intervent. 105 (2012). 
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forested.11  The fragmented nature of small-scale agriculture may provide 
some measure of employment to Haiti’s population, but presents enormous 
barriers to monitoring and regulation of water resources. 
These resources appear to be unsustainably exploited in part because 
very little information exists about water supplies and demands.  In the Trou 
du Nord watershed in northern Haiti, for example, large-scale housing 
developments, mining operations, infrastructural improvements, and 
industrial manufacturing have either been planned or recently introduced 
despite the virtual non-existence of data on precipitation, climate, surface 
water flows, or groundwater that would normally precipitate such 
investments to ensure reliable water supplies exist for development.12   
Shortcomings in water resources management can be partly attributed to 
forces outside of Haiti’s control.  The 2010 earthquake, a mountainous 
geography prone to hurricanes and extreme precipitation, cheap agricultural 
imports, and a history of brutal colonial enslavement and economic 
isolation have made their mark on the water sector.13  But by and large, 
Haiti’s water resources management challenges are challenges of 
governance that go beyond the water sector.  Since the Duvalier family took 
power in 1957, Haiti’s political landscape has been marred by pervasive 
corruption, political (and at times violent) turmoil, and irresponsible fiscal 
policies that enriched a few while leaving Haiti’s population with little in 
the way of government services.14  As is common under these 
circumstances, natural resources were unsustainably exploited.   
Today the Haitian state continues to suffer from low levels of human 
and financial resources, affecting regulatory development and enforcement 
capacities.  The breakdown of effective governance creates many 
challenges, among them the ability to understand how a sector is organized, 
who has authority to manage it, and whether that authority is matched with 
capacity and political will.  This study targets the water sector in order to 
fill the gap in understanding the laws, policies, institutions, and capacities 
that collectively form the water governance framework of Haiti. 
 
                                                 
11
 Id. 
12
 Henry Briceno, Data Gap Analysis and Review of Available Modeling Data in the 
Pic and its Contributing Watershed, 59 (2015). 
13
 See, e.g., Paul Farmer, The Uses of Haiti (Common Courage Press 1994); Robert 
Debt Heinl, Nancy Gordon Heinl & Michael Heinl, Written in Blood: The Story of the 
Haitian People 1942-1995 (UPA Newly Revised Edition 2005); and Laurent Dubois, 
Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (First Harv. Univ. Press 
Ed. 2005). 
14
 See generally Kate Quinn and Paul Sutton, The Politics of Power in Haiti (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013); and Laurent Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History (Metropolitan 
Books Henry Holt and Company, LLC 2012). 
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B.  Prior Research 
This study is not the first attempt to analyze water governance in Haiti.  
Of the various thoughtful articles that touch on this subject in some 
capacity,15 three are profiled here.  Each identifies similar challenges, 
suggesting that shortcomings in the sector are the result of embedded or 
underlying conditions.  Nonetheless, prior studies come to different 
conclusions regarding reform.  While this study does not take a position on 
these proposals, they are provided to display the diversity in approaches 
recommended for the sector. 
In 1998 Evens Emmanuel and Jean Dubus produced the “Bilan-
Diagnostic Du Secteur Eau/Assainissement; Scenario Pour la Creation 
d’une Autorite Nationale de L’Eau,”16 which comprehensively examined 
the institutions and policies responsible for composing the water sector in 
Haiti.  The review is two-parted.  In the first, Emmanuel and Dubus assess 
the state of the water sector, and conclude that three groups of actors merit 
further support and scrutiny: administrative agencies, who require increased 
capacity; educational institutions, who should make partnerships with 
foreign research groups; and NGOs, who should focus their attention on 
water supply, sanitation, and hygiene.17  Many of the observations made in 
1998 appear valid to this day.   
In the second part, the authors state their case for a reorganization of the 
water sector.  First and foremost, a national water authority is envisioned, 
wherein an inter-ministerial council, Water Ministry, and National Water 
Fund are to be established under the auspices of the Prime Minister.18  The 
authors advocate for a somewhat decentralized approach by creating Basin 
and Aquifer Commissions, but philosophically the paper places most 
emphasis on strengthening national administrative agencies and capacities 
by creating institutions devoted to water resources management.19  It is 
important to note that the Emmanuel-Dubus report was published before 
many of the laws and policies analyzed in this document were enacted, and 
therefore should be read with historical context in mind.  That dynamic 
notwithstanding, many of the report’s observations appear to hold true 
today, and the proposals for a national water authority address the same 
concerns expressed in this study. 
                                                 
15
 See, e.g., Ministry of the Environment of Haiti, Integrating the Management of 
Watersheds and Coastal Areas in Haiti, Haiti National Report (2001); Jean Andre Victor, 
Synthese de la Legislation et des Politiques Environnementales, (2006); Noel, Smucker & 
Victor, Environmental Risks & Opportunities in Haiti: A Background Analysis (2007). 
16
 Evens Emmanuel & Jean Dubus, Bilan-Diagnostic Du Secteur Eau/Assainissement: 
Scenario Pour la Creation d’une Autorite Nationale de L’Eau (1998). 
17
 Id. at 46. 
18
 Id. at 56-57. 
19
 See Id. at 67-69. 
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In 2008, a research team led by the Center for Human Rights and Global 
Justice at the New York University (NYU) School of Law produced “Wòch 
nan Soley: The Denial of the Right to Water in Haiti.”20  The study 
integrates human rights law and public health to assess the state of water 
provision in Haiti.  By taking a human rights-based approach to its water 
sector analysis, the researchers argue that the Haitian state and foreign 
institutions (including the United States and the IDB) violate the rights of 
the Haitian people by not following through on commitments to provide 
water in sufficient quantity, quality, and accessibility.21  The findings are 
significant in that, while many observers place blame on Haitian institutions 
for an underperforming water sector, the researchers criticize international 
organizations for filling the gap without providing transparency or 
accountability.   The solution, they argue, is a national water strategy that 
follows a rights-based approach, creating tangible obligations for the 
Haitian government and foreign institutions.22  The veracity of this 
approach likely turns on whether the right to water is found to exist in 
international law and in Haiti. 
Finally, in 2009 Martin Bush and Emmanuel Sildor – contracted by the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) – released 
“Watershed Management in Haiti: Recommended Revisions to National 
Policy.”23  The report focuses on the apparent disconnect between the 
Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture with respect to 
water resources management, but concludes that both ministries show 
substantial agreement towards, and support for, strengthening local 
government management of water resources.24  The recommendations that 
follow largely support this point of agreement, calling for increased 
capacity to both ministries for staff in the field and at the watershed level, as 
well as increased support for watershed councils and local governments.25  
The report summarizes overlaps in jurisdiction and mandate between 
ministries, while largely leaving the existing water sector framework in 
place. 
Much has changed since these research efforts were undertaken, not 
least of which was the 2010 earthquake that leveled much of Port-au-
Prince.26  In January of 2015, the parliament of Haiti was dissolved, 
                                                 
20
 Amanda Klasing et al., Wòch nan Soley: The Denial of the Right to Water in Haiti, 
N.Y.U. Ctr. for Human Rights and Global Justice (2008). 
21
 Id. at 2. 
22
 Id. at 54. 
23
 Martin Bush & Emmanuel Sildor, U.S. Agency Int’l Dev: Watershed Management 
in Haiti: Recommended Revisions to National Policy, (2009). 
24
 Id. at 33. 
25
 Id. at 35. 
26
 For a general examination of the earthquake and its aftermath, see Janet Reitman, 
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allowing the national government to rule by decree and sparking regular 
protests in the nation’s capital.27  Nonetheless, many of the conclusions 
drawn by prior researchers describe challenges Haiti continues to face 
today, and their proposals for reform address many of the same issues this 
study identifies.  The following analyses is thus an affirmation, update, and, 
where applicable, divergence from prior research.   
 
 
II. THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
A.  Institutions 
1. Ministry of the Environment28  
The Ministry of the Environment is statutorily responsible for most 
aspects of water resources management, including water quality regulation, 
policy-making, monitoring and evaluation, inter-ministerial coordination, 
conservation, and enforcement.   Some of these powers were explicitly 
inherited from the Ministry of Agriculture in recent years.29  Its broad and 
ambitious mandate is unfortunately coupled with an acute lack of capacity 
in both management and technical expertise.  It has too few staff to work on 
the many environmental challenges facing the country, and the staff it does 
have lack key skills, tools, and resources to effectively carry out their 
assignments. 
 
2. Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development30 
By contrast, the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural 
Development has extensive resources (both human and financial) at its 
disposal, and exerts significant control over water resources management 
decisions, particularly those actions affecting irrigation and land use.  It 
retains significant and nearly exclusive authority over irrigation and 
agricultural water management, although it has recently attempted to 
broaden its powers to include watershed management in general.31  Its 
watershed management policies attempt to bring local governments into its 
                                                                                                                            
Beyond Relief: How the World Failed Haiti, Rolling Stone (2011) (Aug. 2, 2015), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/how-the-world-failed-haiti-20110804. 
27
 Jacqueline Charles, Haiti Launches Campaign Season for Elections, Miami Herald 
(2015) (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/haiti/article26921350.html. 
28
 Ministry of the Environment: Official Site (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.mde-
h.gouv.ht/. 
29
 See infra, note 30.  
30
 Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development: Official Site 
(Aug. 2, 2015), http://agriculture.gouv.ht/view/01/. 
31
 See infra, note 57.  
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policy regime, though from a legal-regulatory perspective, the Ministry of 
Agriculture has little statutory support for its role in establishing water 
resources policy.  Still, it exerts significant influence in the sector due to its 
financial and human resources, and the importance of agriculture to the 
Haitian economy.32 
 
3. Ministry of Public Works, Transportation, and Communication33 
The Ministry of Public Works, Transportation, and Communication is 
responsible for water supply, sanitation, and hygiene through its Direction 
Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement (DINEPA - National 
Directorate for Water Supply and Sanitation),34 a poorly funded agency 
tasked with implementing the 2009 Framework Law on Water Supply,35 
coordinating donor assistance, regulating water service providers, and 
facilitating decentralization of water supply management.  In addressing 
water supply and sanitation DINEPA is taking on one of Haiti’s foremost 
challenges,36 though it appears the agency’s staff are ill-equipped to address 
Haiti’s water supply needs and rely heavily on NGOs and international 
development assistance. 
 
4. Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation37 
The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation plays a coordinating 
role between the various government ministries, as well as the multitude of 
donors and donor-funded projects.  Of particular interest is the Comité 
Interministériel d’Aménagement du Territoire (CIAT – Inter-ministerial 
Committee for the Management of the Territory),38 a committee charged 
with coordinating actions among Ministries.  The CIAT is composed of the 
Ministries of Agriculture, Environment, and Planning, as well as the 
Ministries of the Interior, Public Works, and Finance. It is chaired by the 
Prime Minister, and has the potential to be a strong voice in setting water 
                                                 
32
 Agriculture remains the largest sector of the Haitian economy, despite efforts to 
diversify. See, e.g., Rashmee Roshan Lall, Haiti’s Employment Push Turns to Textiles as 
Farming Tradition Uprooted, (2013) (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/poverty-matters/2013/aug/21/haiti-employment-textiles-farming. 
33
 Ministry of Public Works, Transportation, and Communication: Official Site (Aug. 
2, 2015), http://www.mtptc.gouv.ht/. 
34
 National Directorate for Water Supply and Sanitation: Official Site (Aug. 2, 2015), 
http://www.dinepa.gouv.ht/. 
35
 See infra, note 70.  
36
 See, e.g., supra note 1, at introduction (“Haiti is the most underserved country in the 
western hemisphere in terms of water and sanitation infrastructure by a wide margin”). 
37
 Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation: Official Site (site unavailable at 
time of access) http://www.mpce.gouv.ht/. 
38
 Committee for the Management of the Territory: Official Site (Aug. 2, 2015), 
http://ciat.gouv.ht/. 
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policy.  Its operational and management framework, however, is relatively 
ambiguous.  One of its explicit components is watershed management,39 but 
to date there is little evidence that watershed management is a priority for 
the committee. 
 
5. Ministry of the Economy and Finance40 
The Ministry of the Economy and Finance coordinates the national 
budget approval process and helps establish priority funding targets.  For 
that reason it plays a large role in determining how much support the 
ministries and local governments involved in water management will 
receive.  In general Haiti’s national budget is relatively limited, but is still 
relied on to provide essential water management services. A Technical 
Execution Unit (UTE) of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance also 
oversees the administration of projects affecting water resources, such as 
the Caracol Industrial Park.   
 
6. Sections, Communes, and Departments 
Haitian government life is divided between the national government and 
local collectivities.41  Sections form communes, and communes form 
departments.  Departments form the highest level of sub-national 
government.  In principle Haiti has embraced decentralized water 
management policies, which promote water management and service 
delivery at the lowest appropriate governance level.  Accordingly, the 
national government has promulgated several laws transferring authority 
over water resources (including water supply, sanitation, and hygiene, and 
the development of environmental action plans) to local territories 
(including Sections, Communes, and Departments).  However, the 
legislation has not clearly articulated a coordinated or strategic direction for 
water resources management, and has not provided local institutions with 
the funding or human resources necessary to carry out a successful and 
sustainable decentralization strategy.  The laws also fail to clearly establish 
which ministry or ministries the municipalities should work with to develop 
their water resource management plans.  These challenges are demonstrated 
by the case study of the Trou du Nord watershed below. 
 
                                                 
39
 Committee for the Management of the Territory: Watershed Management (site 
unavailable at time of access), http://ciat.gouv.ht/dossiers/dossier.php?id_dossier=13. 
40
 Ministry of the Economy and Finance: Official Site (site unavailable at time of 
access), http://www.mefhaiti.gouv.ht/. 
41
 For an overview of the decentralization of Haitian government, see generally 
Sigifredo Ramirez, Andre Lafontant & Michael Enders, Local Government 
Decentralization Assessment in Haiti, U.S. Agency for International Development (2006). 
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7. Foreign Donors and Private Sector Actors  
There are a multitude of non-Haitian actors playing a role in the water 
sector, including foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations, 
and NGOs that occupy the governance gap in the water sector created by a 
weak Haitian state, and private sector businesses and organizations that 
operate for-profit enterprises. As mentioned above, the Ministry of Planning 
coordinates donor activity, broadly authorizing projects and guiding donors 
toward areas of critical need.  In practice this is a difficult task, as Haiti 
attracts an overwhelming number of non-profit entities seeking to make an 
impact.42   
The private sector also plays a large role in water management.  Private 
companies offering to build manufacturing plans and provide foreign 
investment in Haiti have significant influence over local and national 
governmental affairs, and can demand water rights or shield themselves 
from prosecution.  In other ways the private sector may organize its affairs 
to promote its interests.  The Société Nationale des Parcs Industriels 
(SONAPI - National Society of Industrial Parks)43 is an industrial and 
commercial autonomous body whose duty is to implement, promote, 
organize and manage Industrial Parks in Haiti, including the Caracol 
Industrial Park and Metropolitan Industrial Park.  While SONAPI’s 
capacity to craft water policy is limited, its importance to the Haitian 
economy gives it a voice in national affairs. 
 
B.  Laws and Policies 
1. 1984 Rural Code François Duvalier44   
The Rural Code is a framework legal instrument regulating many 
aspects of rural Haitian life.  As a general matter it does not delegate much 
authority to collectivities or provide a baseline from which collectivities can 
add localized regulations.  Instead many aspects of rural life are proscribed 
by the national government in surprisingly specific ways. As pertains to 
water management, the Rural Code is similarly rigid, requiring for example 
that anyone seeking to make a diversion from a water source apply for a 
permit and that the application be investigated on-site.45  A permit can be 
issued as long as the water is not already allocated and promotes the public 
                                                 
42
 See supra note 26 for a critique of the international community’s overwhelming and 
at times uncoordinated presence in Haiti. 
43
 National Society of Industrial Parks: Decree (Aug. 2, 2015), 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=36838575. 
44
 1984 Rural Code Dr. François Duvalier, Port-au-Prince, Haiti Impr. de l'État (1962). 
45
 For a guide to the permit process, see generally World Bank Group: Dealing with 
Construction Permits in Haiti, steps 6-8 (Aug. 4, 2015), 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/haiti/dealing-with-construction-
permits/. 
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interest.46  In principle this type of water allocation doctrine is reasonable 
and reflects legal doctrine of other jurisdictions (regulated riparianism in the 
United States, for example).  In this case the Rural Code appears not to 
appreciate how difficult implementation and enforcement might be.   
In other cases the Rural Code appears to articulate a broader water 
management philosophy but does not follow through on that promise with 
subsequent support or clarification.  In Article 132, for example, a 
landowner is entitled to use streamwater passing through his/her property as 
long as the land is well maintained and at least two-thirds of it is used for 
agriculture.47   The passage raises a number of questions: How are we to 
define “well-maintained”? Who has the authority to make that 
determination?  Why prioritize agricultural uses over all other potential 
uses?  Why was two-thirds chosen as the threshold?  Absent a broader 
approach towards water management, the Rural Code comes off as arbitrary 
and centrally imposed. 
 
2. 1987 Constitution of the Republic of Haiti48  
The Haitian Constitution contains several provisions that indirectly 
address water resources management.  Article 22 recognizes a right of every 
citizen to decent housing, education, food, and social security,49 while 
Article 23 recognizes a right to appropriate means to protect human 
health.50  Article 36-5 distinguishes an individual’s right to property from 
coasts, springs, rivers, and watercourses, which belong to the state.51  
Article 52-1 imposes on citizens a duty to respect and protect the 
environment.52  Articles 253-258 broadly address the government’s role 
towards the environment, articulating vague principles of environmental 
protection.53 
The question is whether or not the Constitution imposes on the state or 
individuals a meaningful right or duty with respect to water resources.  
Some observers (such as the NYU research team) argue that because water 
is necessary to fulfill explicit rights (like food), it is an implicit right 
provided by the Constitution.54  A more strict interpretation of the text 
would dismiss any notion of implicit rights.  In any case, it is not clear what 
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impact environmental rights would have even if they were explicit.   
 
3. 1999 Ministry of the Environment Environmental Action Plan55  
The Ministry of the Environment’s Environmental Action Plan created a 
grand vision for environmental management in Haiti.  Of particular 
importance here is Priority Program 5: Management of Strategic 
Watersheds.  The program calls for several implementing strategies, 
including land-use plans, watershed management plans, and the promotion 
of “conservationist agriculture.”56  Unfortunately, while the plan receives 
high marks for its vision and participatory approach, it fails to demonstrate 
how the vision will be carried out.  Its goals are ambitious but the plan does 
not address the incremental steps that will be necessary to reach those goals.  
It does not, for example, address inter-ministerial coordination or establish 
firm commitments.    
 
4. 1999 Ministry of Agriculture Watershed Management Policy57 
Around the same time that the Environmental Action Plan was being 
developed, the Ministry of Agriculture was setting in motion its own vision 
for water policy.  The Watershed Management Policy is remarkable for two 
reasons.  First, the policy set up a bottom-up approach towards developing 
watershed management plans by requiring collectivities to develop a micro-
watershed plan that would be integrated into plans developed by the next 
highest level of government.58  The policy asserts that financial and human 
resources would be made available to collectivities to undertake this 
process, though this has rarely been the case.  Second, the policy appears to 
broaden the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture significantly.  While 
the ministry was authorized to regulate water used for irrigation, it had not 
previously been in charge of creating watershed management plans, which 
are by nature cross-sectoral and address water uses other than agriculture.  It 
is largely for this reason, and the Environmental Management Decree that 
followed, that the Ministry of Agriculture’s Watershed Management Policy 
is viewed as lacking the statutory authority to wield the force of law.59  
Since the ministry is relatively well-staffed relative to other agencies this 
has not prevented it from exerting some control over watershed 
management, but there remains a disconnect between the ministry’s internal 
policy and its statutory authority.   
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5. 2006 Environmental Management Decree60  
Perhaps because the Ministry of Agriculture expanded its authority over 
water resources management, in 2006 the Environmental Management 
Decree made explicit the Ministry of the Environment’s authority over 
national environmental policy.61  This includes the right to declare eroded 
land to be inappropriate for agriculture, and explicitly transfer powers over 
forest management and water resources from the Ministry of Agriculture to 
the Ministry of the Environment.62  It also requires the Ministry of the 
Environment to lead the coordination effort between ministries and local 
governments, and creates the same bottom-up approach to environmental 
management planning that the Ministry of Agriculture’s Watershed 
Management Policy created in 1999.63 
The Environmental Management Decree is somewhat more specific 
regarding roles and responsibilities, clearly vesting authority over water 
resources to the Ministry of the Environment, and clarifying that material 
support to collectivities will be provided by the central government budget.  
Still, by keeping authority over irrigation systems with the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Decree somewhat ambiguously creates a competitive 
dynamic between the two ministries.64  The Decree also doesn’t provide 
commitments toward staffing and financing the Ministry of the 
Environment,65 a vital component of any environmental management 
strategy. 
   
6. 2006 Decentralization Decree66  
In line with the principle of subsidiarity,67 the Decentralization Decree 
aimed to delegate certain powers to local governments.  Chapter 3 of the 
Decree addresses the environment, imposing on sections, communes, and 
departments the duty to enforce logging prohibitions, protect watercourses, 
control pollution, and regulate livestock farming.68  Communes are 
                                                 
60
 Environmental Management Decree, art. 1-162 (2006); see generally 11 Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Haiti 161 (2006) (Aug. 3, 2015), 
http://law.sc.edu/pathfinder/haiti/docs/20060126-environmental_management.pdf. 
61
 Id. at art. 20. 
62
 Id. at art. 100. 
63
 Id. at art. 20, 115, 116. 
64
 Article 117 of the Decree gives water use priority to ecosystems over agriculture or 
irrigation, but acting on this priority remains challenging. 
65
 Environmental Management Decree, art. 77-9 (2006). 
66
 Decret sur le Cadre de la Decentralisation, Fevrier (2006). 
67
 For a discussion of the principle of subsidiarity, see Ryan Stoa, Subsidiarity in 
Principle: Decentralization of Water Resources Management, 10 Utrecht L. Rev. 31 
(2014). 
68
 Decret sur le Cadre de la Decentralisation, Fevrier, ch. 3 (2006). 
[30-July-15] Water Governance in Haiti 15 
specifically responsible for elaborating resource management plans and 
building dams and reservoirs, and departments must monitor facilities, 
verify impact studies, and establish protected areas.69  The Decree may seek 
to empower local governments, but without a commitment to provide 
financial and human resources to them, a Decree of this nature cannot be 
fulfilled.  Many sections, communes, and departments have poor or non-
existent offices, part-time staff with low qualifications, and/or more 
pressing political concerns.  The idea that sections are equipped to combat 
illegal logging, for example, is unrealistic.  Absent a complementary plan to 
build capacity of local governments, the Decree has little positive impact on 
water resources management. 
    
7. 2009 Framework Law on Water Supply70  
Water supply, sanitation, and hygiene is an immense problem in Haiti.  
According to the World Health Organization, one-third of Haitians do not 
have access to an improved water source,71 and four-fifths do not have 
access to improved sanitation.72  To combat the situation the government 
enacted the Framework Law on Water Supply.  The Framework vests 
significant authority in the Ministry of Public Work’s DINEPA, including 
the authority to set policy, create pricing schemes, establish water quality 
standards, issuing permits, enforcing violations, and mediating disputes.73  
These are important powers to enumerate in an implementing agency, and 
with the authority to set further policies and regulations, DINEPA should be 
well-suited, from a statutory perspective, to improve water and sanitation 
services.  Unfortunately, the law does not commit the government to 
adequate funding sources, nor does it create and staff institutions or 
mechanisms to implement many of its provisions.74  The Framework Law 
on Water Supply is a good first step, but the scale of the problem 
(compounded by the 2010 earthquake) is so vast that the law alone is not 
enough to adequately address water and sanitation issues. 
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C.  Cross-Cutting Challenges 
1. Statutory Obscurity  
Successful implementation of a law or policy starts with the statutory 
text of the law itself.  If the law is written clearly enough the implementing 
agency is enabled to carry out their mandate.  If the law is not clearly 
written, or does not create means to enact its desired outcomes, or is not 
coherently placed in a broader legal framework, successful implementation 
is doomed from the start.75  There appear to be examples of all three 
shortcomings here.  Many of the above water laws are ambiguously written 
or provide too little direction for an agency and other government partners 
to follow.  In other cases, laws are too proscriptive and burdensome for 
enforcement to be realistic, eroding the legitimacy of the law.   
Consider the Ministry of Agriculture’s Watershed Management Policy.  
On the one hand its policy goals give ambiguously equal weight to 
agricultural production and environmental conservation, ignoring the fact 
that production and conservation often conflict and giving ministry officials 
little guidance on how to resolve those conflicts.  On the other hand, the 
policy proscribes a rigid watershed resources management plan scheme that 
requires micro-watershed organizations to create a plan, which is 
incorporated into a section-level plan, which is incorporated into a 
commune-level plan, which is incorporated into a department-level plan.  In 
practice this process is burdensome on local governments who have neither 
the means to develop, or the authority to approve, their own plans.  As a 
result this process is largely ignored.   
       
2. Regulatory Capacity  
In other cases the statutory text may strike a balance between ambiguity 
and rigidity, but does not match up with the capabilities of the 
implementing agency.  If a law is too ambitious relative to capacity, the 
agency will not be able to fulfill its mandate and may have to choose 
between lesser outcomes the original text did not contemplate.76  Similarly, 
if a law is not ambitious enough, the agency will fulfill its mandate and 
either waste excess capacity by doing nothing, or devote resources to 
additional tasks the original text did not contemplate.  In the Haitian water 
sector the former scenario is most prevalent.  The 2009 Framework Law on 
Water Supply, for example, vests DINEPA (through the Ministry of Public 
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Works) with broad powers and responsibilities over drinking water and 
sanitation.  These include: creating pricing schemes; establishing water 
quality standards; issuing permits; monitoring and evaluating water quality 
and system performance; approving infrastructure projects; and mediating 
between contractors.  These responsibilities are not inappropriate in 
principle, but considering the human and financial resources at DINEPA’s 
disposal, and the current state of drinking water and sanitation in Haiti, the 
law’s ambitions do not match the regulatory capacity of its implementing 
agency. 
       
3. Horizontal Coordination  
As the above discussion of the institutional framework demonstrates, 
water management authority is shared between several national level 
ministries.  While the Ministry of the Environment enjoys broad powers 
over water resources management, two of the largest and most critical water 
users – agriculture and water supply – are governed by the Ministries of 
Agriculture and Public Works, respectively.77  The Ministry of Planning 
and its CIAT are responsible for inter-ministerial coordination, but water 
sector planning is only one of many cross-cutting issues it must address.78  
Not enough is being done to facilitate cooperation and jointly find 
opportunities between ministries.  The Environmental Management Decree 
assigns the responsibility for water sector coordination to the Ministry of 
the Environment,79 but it is not well placed to persuade other ministries to 
cooperate.   
Furthermore, there is little in the way of water sector coordination 
between donors and donor projects.  Because regulatory capacity in Haiti is 
low, many donors have stepped into the vacuum and fulfill public services, 
such as housing, primary care, or infrastructural development.  In each of 
these sectors there are coordination challenges to overcome.  This is true in 
the water sector as well, where donors and projects carry out workplans 
without exploring potential benefits of cooperation.80  Here also the 
Ministry of the Environment and to some extent the CIAT are in charge of 
coordination, but both appear overwhelmed with the task.  Whether 
between ministries, donors, or the sector as a whole, horizontal coordination 
is lacking in the water sector. 
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4. Vertical Coordination  
There is too little coordination between local governments and the 
national government as well.  Several water law frameworks identify a role 
for collectivities or even impose obligations on them, such as the 
MARNDR Watershed Management Policy, Environmental Management 
Decree, or Decentralization Decree.81  And yet, the various roles and 
responsibilities sections, communes, and departments have with each other 
and the national ministries is not collectively well thought out. 
For example, both the MARNDR Watershed Management Policy and 
the Environmental Management Decree establish a bottom-up approach 
whereby sections, communes, and departments must prepare natural 
resources management plans (MARNDR) and environmental management 
plans (MoE) for watersheds, which are integrated into the plans of the next 
highest level of government.82  Given the similarities between these 
processes and their subject matter, it would be logical to expect that they be 
integrated in some way to reduce redundancies and promote holistic 
thinking.  That does not appear to be the case.  Instead, to whatever extent 
these parallel processes are actually carried out is done so independently of 
each other.   
       
5. Enforcement  
If a government agency sets a policy that is subsequently violated, that 
agency (or another, but at least one) must be able to enforce the policy by 
prosecuting the violation, thereby obtaining injunctive relief, compensation 
for damages, or some other equitable solution.  An agency can also enforce 
its policies by making it less likely that a violation will occur in the first 
place.  If an agency cannot enforce a policy, actors become aware and the 
policy will lose meaning or effect.  The water sector in Haiti suffers from a 
lack of enforcement for several reasons.  As mentioned above, agencies 
have little regulatory capacity to develop policies that have a high 
likelihood of success, monitor water users for potential violations, or 
prosecute violators.  Second, factors broader than the water sector’s scope 
frustrate enforcement, such as a relatively weak justice system, or a land 
tenure tradition in which ownership is difficult to ascertain.83  Third, the 
sheer scope of violations makes it challenging and potentially arbitrary to 
decide which violators to target.  For example, Article 137 of the Code 
Rural made it illegal for anyone to pump water from a stream without a 
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permit from the Ministry of Agriculture, who was required to visit the site 
and investigate the water use before issuing a permit.84  If anyone was 
aware of this policy it was likely disregarded, as the Ministry of Agriculture 
is not capable of monitoring and enforcing each individual collection point.  
Individuals might develop a reasonable basis with which to assume the 
policy is outdated or no longer valid, and punishing some violators in this 
scenario might be deemed inequitable.   
Enforcement problems arise when donor-funded projects take on a large 
role in the water sector as well.  On the one hand, donors are often based 
abroad, with foreign staff, bank accounts, and constituencies.  This makes it 
difficult for the Haitian government to insist that its policies be respected 
when donor projects adopt their own approach.  On the other hand, donor 
projects carry out some important public services (such as clean water 
provision) and therefore take on a government-like role, but lack the 
authority to prosecute violations (such as overconsumption of a well or 
dumping pollutants into a river).   
       
6. Financing 
An undercurrent of this assessment is that the water sector in Haiti is 
under-funded.  Developing a coherent and integrated legal framework, 
building regulatory capacity, establishing and staffing coordination 
mechanisms, and enforcing policies requires money.  Haiti is notoriously 
poor, with meager tax revenues and an economy reliant on small-scale 
agriculture.85  Low levels of education and corruption are common.86  The 
capital was hit hard by the 2010 earthquake, and while foreign countries and 
international organizations promised billions of dollars in aid, those funds 
appear to be tightly controlled.87  As a result the Haitian government has a 
modest budget for public services, and what budget does exist provides 
little in the way of water resources management.88  This is most apparent 
when observing regulatory capacity, as small teams of ministry staff are 
tasked with ambitious national mandates.  Low levels of financing have 
many indirect impacts as well.  A watershed management plan cannot be 
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developed if stakeholders are not compensated for their time or cannot 
afford to take time off work to participate in the process.  Violations of 
water law are unlikely to be enforced if the injured party cannot afford 
representation and an administrative agency will not take action.  And a 
grand vision or philosophy for water law in Haiti will remain illusory if not 
coupled with a commitment to finance ambitious reforms.  There may be 
budget-neutral solutions to water sector problems, but many solutions will 
require investment.    
 
 
III. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES IN THE TROU DU NORD WATERSHED 
 
The first phase of this study collected and analyzed the laws, policies, 
and institutions involved in water resources management in Haiti.  Results 
from that phase suggest that the laws and policies affecting water resources 
create a fragmented and uncoordinated water management framework, in 
which national ministries have overlapping mandates and rarely coordinate 
their efforts effectively.  In addition, while the legal framework transfers 
significant management authorities (and responsibilities) to local 
governments, there is little else in the way of statutory or regulatory 
guidance for these governments to rely on.  For that reason, the legal 
framework creates broad ambiguities regarding how local governments are 
to be financed, staffed, or otherwise carry out their water management 
duties.  These uncertainties could, in theory, create the interpretational 
space needed for local governments to experiment with water management 
strategies and techniques in ways that foster resilience and increase 
sustainability.89  In practice, it seems more likely that opaque legal 
mandates would create confusion and leave local governments ill-equipped 
to tackled the daunting challenges of water management.   
The following case study of institutional capacities in the Trou du Nord 
watershed in northern Haiti suggests that most agencies and stakeholders 
have neither the human nor the financial resources in place to fulfill their 
mandates.  Some, however, such as DINEPA’s local representatives or the 
University of Limonade, are relatively well-staffed and exhibit the 
continuity of presence needed to justify targeted capacity building efforts.  
Others, such as the sections and communes in the region, may have low 
levels of capacity in water resources management but merit engagement in 
order to secure broad participation in water management planning efforts.  
The institutional capacity analysis that follows has been conducted with an 
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eye towards informing the final component of the IDB project funding this 
study: an integrated water resources management plan for the Trou-du-Nord 
watershed. 
 
A.  Institutional Capacity Assessments 
1. Communes90 
The Trou du Nord river is located in the Trou du Nord Arrondissement, 
a subdivision of the Northeast Department of Haiti.  The Arrondissement 
contains four communes: Caracol, Saint Suzanne, Terrier-Rouge, and Trou-
du-Nord.91  These communes comprise the local government bloc of 
stakeholders most integral to a participatory water management planning 
strategy, as they represent the core geographic regions of the watershed, 
while exhibiting a level of regulatory and management activity that lower 
levels of government (i.e., sections within the communes) lack.  For the 
most part the four communes do not employ any full-time staff dedicated to 
water resources, though some activities fall within the broad scope of water 
management.  More important, perhaps, is the local support and buy-in that 
would be needed from each commune to effectively carry out a water 
management plan that modifies the status quo in any meaningful way. 
Caracol is a flood-prone coastal commune on Caracol Bay, at the mouth 
of the Trou-du-Nord river.  It is sparsely populated, but due to the Caracol 
Industrial Park’s presence, demographics are in flux and electricity is 
reliable.  The commune reports a total annual budget of less than 
$195,000,92 of which over 40% comes from a European Union development 
project.93  The 39 staff receive an annual salary of around $4,320, but none 
are dedicated to water management per se.  A significant portion of 
commune tasks pertain to waste management, accomplished with 
wheelbarrows and two motorcycles.  There are no vehicles, nor is there a 
disposal site in the commune.  While commune staff do not engage in water 
management themselves, they do work closely with DINEPA staff on water 
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projects when necessary. 
On the opposite end of the watershed, the commune of Saint Suzanne 
sits at the source of the Trou-du-Nord river and comprises a significant 
portion of the watershed’s catchment area.  The overall budget and staff 
salaries are similar to those of Caracol, though in practice staff are often not 
paid on time.  The office has one functioning computer, one motorcycle, 
and no human or financial resources dedicated to water management.  
DINEPA’s presence is minimal, supplemented by periodic wells drilled by 
international NGOs.  Staff conduct street cleaning, but lack an official 
disposal site.  Hygiene facilities are minimal to non-existent.   
The communes of Terrier-Rouge and Trou-du-Nord lie between 
upstream Saint Suzanne and downstream Caracol.  Terrier-Rouge is the 
eastern commune, sitting directly on the Route Nationale of the northern 
transportation corridor.  The industrial park has financed new housing 
projects and reliable electricity in the commune.  A municipal engineer on 
staff facilitates the issuance of construction permits, and the commune has 
hired eight staff to conduct reforestation work.  Most other staff are engaged 
in street cleaning.  The commune lacks a waste disposal site, though plans 
are in place to build a site capable of serving multiple communes.  
DINEPA’s presence, and hygiene facilities, are minimal and supplemented 
by international NGOs.  The overall budget and staff salaries are similar to 
those of Caracol, with neither dedicated to water management in any 
meaningful way. 
Finally, the Trou-du-Nord commune forms the western flank of the 
watershed.  The river flows through the commune before passing by the 
industrial park.  While no housing projects have been constructed its 
proximity to the park has enabled reliable electricity throughout the 
commune.  The commune is relatively well-staffed, with an engineer on 
hand to issue construction permits, and staff engaged in waste management 
and small-scale hygiene projects.  However, little infrastructure is available 
for these purposes, as the commune has only one tricycle and some 
wheelbarrows, no disposal site, and a dysfunctional water supply system.  
 
2. National Ministries94 
The statutory or policy framework outlined in the first stage of this 
study placed significant emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity, or the 
idea that water management should take place at the lowest appropriate 
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governance level.95  The Framework Law on Water Supply, Environmental 
Management Decree, and Agricultural Watershed Management Policy 
envision a large role for local governments.96  The Decentralization Decree 
explicitly addresses this strategy,97 but even in 1984 the Rural Code tasked 
local governments with carrying out varied and relatively complex 
regulatory activities.98  To implement decentralized policies, national 
ministries created regional offices, with staff in place to represent the 
ministry and carry out its mandate.  Local representatives of national 
ministries in the Trou-du-Nord watershed are therefore a potentially fruitful 
partner, in the sense that they can marshal ministry resources toward local 
initiatives, while remaining knowledgeable of conditions on the ground.  
Unfortunately there is a stark contrast between the regional capacities of 
DINEPA and the Ministry of Agriculture, who are well-staffed in the 
region, and the Ministry of Environment, CIAT, and UTE, whose presence 
is marginal to non-existent. 
The Ministry of the Environment, with statutory responsibilities over 
water resources management (and more broadly, natural resources 
management), environmental policy-making, enforcement, and inter-
ministerial coordination, has a conspicuously limited presence in the Trou-
du-Nord watershed.  The Ministry does not have regional representative in 
the Northeastern Department, with only one staff member assigned to a 
regional office in nearby Cap-Haitien.  The lone representative is unable to 
fulfill the broad mandates of the Ministry of the Environment in the region, 
nor capable of working closely with Arrondissements, Communes, or 
Sections to assist local governments with natural or water resources 
management planning. 
The same is true for CIAT and UTE, divisions of the Ministries of 
Planning and Economy, respectively.  Although CIAT has been tasked with 
coordinating the water sector, it principally carries out those responsibilities 
in the capital city, Port au Prince.  UTE, with oversight authority of the 
Caracol Industrial Park, has an occasional presence in the region but does 
not maintain a permanent office in the Department.   
DINEPA, by contrast, has a relatively strong presence in the Trou-du-
Nord watershed.  The agency has established a decentralized staffing 
structure, with regional organizations in place in each department, and 
many urban centers.  Nonetheless, the 29 DINEPA staff overseeing the 
Trou-du-Nord watershed reported a highly centralized decision-making 
process, in which officials at the Ministry’s headquarters in Port au Prince 
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dominate policy-making and dictate the agency’s strategic direction.  Still, 
DINEPA’s water supply, sanitation, and hygiene provision mandate is well 
supported by staff in the watershed, all of whom are dedicated to these 
tasks, and therefore a component of water management.  Staff make 
between $6500-$13000 annually,99 and all have completed their secondary 
education.  The transportation infrastructure is ample, complemented by 
basic laboratory equipment.  Considering the scope of the challenge 
throughout Haiti, staff overseeing the Trou-du-Nord region are 
unsurprisingly outmatched, and little is being done to treat wastewater or 
monitor water quality in the watershed.  Still, the local staff are engaged in 
water management activities and equipped to carry out basic water supply 
projects. 
The Ministry of Agriculture is similarly well-represented in the Trou-
du-Nord watershed.  The ministry’s northeastern regional office employs 60 
staff, including staff placed in Communal Agriculture Bureaus (local offices 
for each commune in the department).  Despite the decentralized nature of 
the Ministry’s Watershed Management Policy, reports on the ground 
indicate that the national office of the ministry maintains tight control over 
policy-making and budgetary allocations, creating heavy reliance from 
regional offices on the ministry’s headquarters.  Staff are compensated 
similarly to DINEPA officials, but the Ministry of Agriculture struggles to 
retain engineers or agronomists due to the higher wages paid by the many 
agricultural projects sponsored by international NGOs.100  More than half of 
the ministry’s staff are dedicated to water management, most in terms of 
irrigation.  Trou-du-Nord offices are hampered by limited access to data or 
modeling on climate, precipitation, surface flows, groundwater stores, or 
soil quality that would enhance agricultural planning.  Nonetheless, the 
agency appears knowledgeable of local conditions and has a meaningful 
presence in the watershed. 
 
3. Caracol Industrial Park101 
Perhaps the most significant development for the Trou-du-Nord 
watershed in recent history has been the construction and operation of the 
Caracol Industrial Park.  While the park has yet to reach full capacity, it is 
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already making an impact in the region.102  As a large apparel manufacturer, 
the Park represents both a challenge and an opportunity.  A challenge 
because the scale of industrial and economic development projected for the 
Park at full capacity may have negative impacts on the watershed’s 
resources.  Water withdrawals may reduce freshwater flows in the Caracol 
Bay estuary, pollutant discharges may degrade water quality, and forest 
clearing may increase the risk of flooding.  Fortunately these risks can be 
mitigated, in part due to the opportunity the Park represents for the 
watershed.  With significant funding from the IDB, USAID, and foreign 
investors, the Park has the financial resources to carry out the watershed 
studies, monitoring programs, and mitigation projects that the 
aforementioned government officials cannot.  The Park’s dual nature as 
both threat and solution therefore makes it a vital stakeholder in the 
development of a watershed management plan. 
With regard to water management, the Park’s structure breaks down into 
a water extraction division and a water treatment division.  The water 
extraction team is employed by SONAPI, are hired as consultants without 
benefits, and focus on the three currently operating pumping stations that 
draw water from the Trou-du-Nord watershed.  There are eight members of 
the extraction team, all relatively well-educated.  The infrastructural 
resources are minimal, however, with no computers or vehicles to assist 
staff with maintaining the pumping stations.  Procurement of parts is time-
consuming as well, with policy mandating Haitian sourcing instead of the 
cheaper and more accessible parts coming from the Dominican Republic.  
The water treatment division is managed by a private contractor, using a 
modified wetlands treatment process to purify water released back into the 
Trou-du-Nord river and, ultimately, Caracol Bay.  Staff consist of 
international experts and local Haitians, and infrastructure appears 
accessible and well-maintained. 
 
 
4. Limonade University 
The State University of Haiti’s Limonade campus opened in 2012, with 
$30 million of investment contributed by the Dominican Republic.103  It is 
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the most modern and well-equipped university campus in northern Haiti, 
and sits less than ten kilometers from the Trou-du-Nord river.  While the 
academic functions of the university remain under development, the 
professional staff and students represent a promising partner for water 
management planning in the region. While the university does not directly 
engage in public water resources management, it has some capacity to 
contribute to management planning.  Faculty in the fields of hydrology, 
hydrogeology, and sustainable development are familiar with best practices 
in the field of water management.104  The proximity of the university to the 
Trou-du-Nord makes the river an attractive study area for scholarly research 
and experiential student learning.  The campus provides modern facilities 
within which water management planning can take place in a professional 
and efficient manner.  The university is not a political agency with 
fluctuating interests, nor an international organization with little local 
history.  While the laboratory facilities are undeveloped and incapable of 
carrying out periodic water quality or quantity testing in the watershed, 
there is interest to match future investments.  Finally, there appears to be 
less turnover in an academic setting than in government offices, providing a 
potential source of continuity in the region. 
 
B.  Implications for Water Resources Management Planning 
Field research conducted on institutional capacities should be 
understood in context.  This study provides a snapshot of existing capacities 
as of 2015, but capacities shift from year to year.105  Feedback provided 
suggests that the existing capacities reflect long-standing limitations in 
water governance – the dominance of the Ministry of Agriculture vis a vis 
the Ministry of the Environment, for example, has been the norm even since 
the Environmental Management Decree transferred many powers to the 
Ministry of the Environment.  In addition, while the institutions analyzed 
above were limited in their abilities to carry out sustainable water 
management policies, not to mention their statutory mandates, the deficit in 
human and financial resources is being periodically filled by the multitude 
of international NGOs and foreign donors in the region.106  These 
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organizations engage in a variety of water management activities, including 
drilling wells, building latrines, conducting research, providing training, and 
supporting government offices.107  While influential, they were not the 
focus of this study in part because a robust water management plan for the 
Trou-du-Nord depends most crucially on leadership and engagement from 
domestic stakeholders.  In addition, while government agencies may shift 
priorities or incur staff turnover, their presence and organizational structure 
remains relatively constant (or changes relatively slowly), while 
internationally-managed projects often operate intensely in a region for a 
period of years before leaving, and are thus more difficult to 
comprehensively integrate into the water management framework.  
Nonetheless, international organizations remain key partners, with 
significant potential contributions to water governance.   
 
1. Strategic Governance Capacity Building 
The capacity assessments of communes in the Trou-du-Nord 
Arrondissement, national ministries, the Caracol Industrial Park, and 
Limonade University suggest that capacity building aimed at improving 
water governance in the watershed be mindful of the characteristics and 
discrepancies between these organizations.  At the moment, for example, it 
does not appear that CIAT, UTE, or most importantly, the Ministry of the 
Environment are able or willing to maintain a presence in northern Haiti, 
much less the watershed.  This is problematic, as the Ministry of the 
Environment is legally responsible for watershed management planning and 
would be the natural lead on a planning effort in the Trou-du-Nord.  
However, it appears that whatever staff are present in northern Haiti are 
fully engaged and overwhelmed.  This is not a conducive environment for a 
training-based approach to capacity building, as the opportunity costs of 
attending training may outweigh the benefits obtained.  Even a staffing-
based approach, in which external funds are dedicated to growing the labor 
force in the Ministry, may not be sufficient to reach a threshold in which the 
Trou-du-Nord receives sufficient regulatory attention. 
The Ministry of Agriculture, on the other hand, has ample staffing and 
local offices in each commune, creating a robust presence in the watershed.  
While staff are primarily focused on irrigation, the prevalence of agriculture 
in the region justifies a strong role for ministry officials in the planning 
effort.  The centralization of policy-making and financial control is limiting, 
but should not impede efforts to diversify skill sets within local ministry 
offices.   
Similarly, DINEPA’s strong presence in the region could be 
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productively supplemented by training and experiential learning in water 
management.  While this is already taking place with the help of 
international NGOs engaged in water supply, sanitation, and hygiene 
services, there is room for placing these activities within a broader water 
management paradigm.  A consideration of the multiple uses and demands 
on water resources would benefit DINEPA and the Trou-du-Nord 
watershed. 
Capacity building of communes – Caracol, Saint Suzanne, Terrier-
Rouge, and Trou-du-Nord – is more than justified, but on a more general 
governance level than a water management-focused approach.  Commune 
staff have little in the way of equipment, training, or policy influence.  
Attaining a level of capacity in which communes can issue permits, monitor 
compliance, and enforce violations would require significant investments 
and time that may not be available prior to development of the Trou-du-
Nord water management plan.  Whether or not these elements are needed to 
maintain a robust management plan remain to be seen, but for purposes of 
this project, a strategy of engagement is likely to be more appropriate at this 
stage.  
The Caracol Industrial Park is not an obvious beneficiary of capacity 
building arising from a Trou-du-Nord water management planning effort, 
despite its strong presence.  Many of its staff appear well-trained in water 
management, are focused on discrete roles, or do not appear likely to be 
permanent fixtures at the park.  The inverse is true of faculty and staff at 
Limonade University, where continuity is likely and interest is broad, but 
existing capacities do not approach the university’s capacity ceiling.  
Because the university is a relatively impartial actor with a stake in the 
Trou-du-Nord watershed’s sustainability, it is an ideal target of capacity 
building, whether focused on faculty, students, or infrastructural resources. 
 
2. Strategic Engagement 
A successful water management plan engages stakeholders to ensure 
broad participation, support, and long-term continuity.108  Too often 
stakeholder engagement is a platitude, involving little more than public 
workshops.  One of the objectives of this study, however, is to provide an 
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institutional capacity analysis of water management in the Trou-du-Nord 
watershed in order to foster a more thoughtful approach to stakeholder 
engagement.  In this case, the various stakeholders bring unique 
contributions to the table, with implications for stakeholder engagement. 
The Ministry of the Environment’s limited presence in the region as a 
whole, for example, creates a dilemma for the Trou-du-Nord planning 
effort.  On the one hand, the watershed would benefit from whatever 
attention the ministry can provide to it, considering the many other 
competing issues in front of its staff.  On the other hand, it is not clear the 
ministry can maintain a continuous presence throughout the planning 
process and beyond.  The ministry was unavailable for comment on this 
study, for example, and did not participate in validation meetings in June 
2015.  Most likely the ministry should be continuously invited to participate 
in water management planning, but not extensively relied on to carry out 
planning functions. 
The four communes, on the other hand, have a large presence in the 
watershed despite their limited governance capacities.  This makes them 
ideally suited to focus on community mobilization, public awareness 
raising, and to provide continuous feedback on the water management plan 
from the citizens and water users they represent and interact with on a daily 
basis.  The communes may play their own roles in the planning process as 
well.  Saint Suzanne, as the “source” commune, may contribute by 
monitoring changes in land use or water demands in the catchment area that 
may influence downstream users.  Caracol, similarly, can be equipped to 
monitor outflows as the “mouth” commune.  Trou-du-Nord and Terrier-
Rouge, as the more urban centers of the region, may be responsible for 
management functions such as the organization of watershed management 
council meetings. 
DINEPA and the Ministry of Agriculture, with their strong presence and 
ongoing water management activities in the watershed, must be centrally 
involved.  Both agencies would benefit from participation in an integrated, 
sector-wide planning process that considers the various competing demands 
on water resources.  Both agencies have large staff in place to carry out 
their statutory mandates, suggesting that cooperation and synergistic 
potential is high.  The influence of national offices in limiting policy-
making and financial control is limiting, but can be overcome collectively 
more easily than alone.  The agencies also have the greatest potential to 
enforce violations of the plan.  Communes lack capacity and cross-
jurisdictional authority, while SONAPI and Limonade University are less 
closely integrated with state functions.   
SONAPI and the Caracol Industrial Park, as the major economic actors 
in the watershed, are equally important.  While neither may be appropriate 
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for capacity building efforts, ensuring that operators of the park are engaged 
and buy into the Trou-du-Nord water management plan is a necessary 
element of the planning process.  Without the park’s support and 
participation, the plan is unlikely to be carried out effectively, if at all.  The 
Park’s resources, as mentioned above, also represent an opportunity to 
initiate meaningful water quality and quantity testing in the watershed.   
Finally, Limonade University’s focus on research and education can be 
harnessed to serve as the intellectual, research, and training center of the 
water management planning process.  Engaging faculty to participate in 
sponsored research, and encouraging students to learn water management 
skills, is a long-term investment in the watershed.109  The university is 
young, and successful engagement into the planning process may guide the 
university’s academic and organizational priorities toward water resources, 
in the Trou-du-Nord watershed and beyond.   
 
 
IV. RESULTS VALIDATION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
An integral component of legal and institutional field research is results 
validation.  Particularly for a study of this nature, in which the legal or 
official backdrop is contrasted by realities on the ground, stakeholders play  
a large role in complementing and calibrating research results.  While this 
study was reviewed by outside experts, two validation workshops were 
conducted in Haiti in mid-June, 2015.  Stakeholders were presented with the 
preliminary results of the legal and institutional analysis, as well as data 
collected during the institutional capacity assessment phase.  Finally, 
stakeholders were presented with a list of oft-cited and potential reforms in 
order to gauge priorities and reform efforts likely to receive a high return on 
investment.  These reform options included the following: 
Establish Water Use Priorities.  A national water strategy is lacking at 
present in Haiti.  This is not particularly unique – the United States 
infamously lacks a national strategy for water management, for example.110  
But a water strategy that prioritizes water uses and articulates a vision or 
philosophy for water resource management could help guide decision-
makers when allocating financial or human resources, approving permits, or 
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when prioritizing enforcement of violations.  Haiti might, for example, 
deem water supply, sanitation, and hygiene a priority use over all other 
water uses.  That would be in line with customary international water law, 
as instruments such as the 1997 United Nations Watercourses Convention 
or the 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources identify vital human needs as 
a priority over all other water uses.  Going further, a national strategy could 
prioritize agriculture/irrigation or environmental protection to be a priority 
over industrial, commercial, recreational, or energy uses.   
Articulating priority of use is the easy part, however.  Carrying out that 
vision is challenging on a number of fronts: 1) it may require restructuring 
of the national budget and human resources; 2) the established priority of 
use may not be in the public interest in each instance in which it is applied; 
and 3) enforcement of the strategy and priorities requires cooperation from 
ministries and local governments.  Merely articulating priority of uses may 
still make an impact however.  Ministries (e.g., Agriculture, Environment, 
Public Works) that issue permits for using water resources will have a guide 
from which to base decisions and national priorities, and courts will have a 
persuasive legislative source of authority to resolve conflicts between water 
users.      
Consolidate Authority.  As proposed by Emmanuel-Dubus in 1998,111 
Haiti could consolidate authority over water resources management into one 
national-level ministry.  Consolidating authority in this manner would 
confer several advantages.  First, it would reduce the need for enhanced 
coordination between the various ministries with a role in water resources 
management, since those activities would be consolidated into one ministry.  
While the ministry itself would need to ensure coordination internally, it is 
likely that it could do so more efficiently than is presently the case, and 
might benefit from the opportunity to build synergies between, for example, 
staff tasked with hydrological data monitoring and urban water suppliers.  
Second, a water ministry would give foreign donors – who have a 
significant presence in the water sector – with one point of contact (or at 
least far fewer points of contact) with which to collaborate and carry out 
water projects.  Donors often carry out their projects without capitalizing on 
opportunities to work with national ministries, and a single water ministry 
would increase the potential for Haitian involvement in foreign projects.  
Similarly, a water ministry would be an elegant way to build relationships 
between the national and local governments.  There is confusion at present 
regarding the obligations of local governments and whom at the national 
level they should be working with.  A single water ministry may clarify the 
roles and responsibilities of local officials, and generally streamline the 
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working relationship between national and local governments. 
Of course, a restructuring of this nature has several costs.  For one, 
existing ministries would have to give up certain powers over water 
management.  In some cases that might not be strategic.  The Ministries of 
Agriculture and Public Works already have significant expertise over 
irrigation and water supply, respectively, and transferring those powers to a 
single water ministry may disrupt existing administrative structures that are 
working well enough.  It is also not clear what role the Ministry of the 
Environment would have in water resources management if a water 
ministry were created.  The Ministry of the Environment is ostensibly 
responsible for many aspects of water management already, but struggles to 
carry out its mandate.  Removing that authority and placing it in a new 
ministry may not overcome the obstacles the Ministry of the Environment is 
facing – the new ministry may simply inherit those problems.      
Strengthen Coordination.  As mentioned above, the water sector in Haiti 
struggles with a lack of coordination between national ministries 
(horizontal) and between national and local governments (vertical).  
Stakeholders also complain of a lack of coordination between them and 
foreign donors.  Accordingly, attention can be paid to creating a 
coordinating body for water resources management in Haiti.  The Ministry 
of Planning and its CIAT currently occupy this space, but they are tasked 
with coordinating all inter-ministerial and donor activities.  Given that all-
encompassing mandate, it is not surprising that water sector coordination 
receives insufficient attention.  Creating a body whose sole task is to 
coordinate between water sector stakeholders would presumably lead to 
opportunities for collaboration, increased learning outcomes, and fewer 
redundant initiatives.  The coordinating body could be a stand-alone, 
independent government body, or logically placed in the Ministry of 
Planning or a newly created water ministry.   
Like any coordinating or inter-institutional body, an inter-ministerial 
entity specific to the water sector is only as productive as its participating 
members want it to be.  The coordinating body is unlikely to wield powers 
capable of compelling action; rather, action will depend on members 
seeking to collaborate and improve water resources management.  It is 
likely that “win-win” opportunities exist in Haiti’s water sector that are not 
being capitalized on due to a failure of communication between 
stakeholders.  In those cases a coordinating body would prove successful.  
But just as likely is the reality that some water resource reforms are a “win-
lose” proposition, and in those cases, a coordinating body will struggle to 
persuade potential losers to take action.   In those cases, a coordinating body 
will represent an empty forum for talk and little action.    
Build Capacity.  Building capacity is a popular and uncontroversial 
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recommendation for many institutions in many countries, and is a favored 
approach to development by many foreign donors.112  Building capacity 
often means improving the quality and quantity of human resources in key 
institutions.  The Ministry of the Environment, for example, has the power 
to manage natural resources in Haiti, but little in the way of qualified 
environmental experts capable of assessing resource issues and acting to 
remediate them.  This is a recurring problem throughout the water sector, as 
local governments lack appropriate expertise to manage water resources and 
ministries lack the staff (or tools) to carry out their mandates.  Therefore, 
building capacity by investing in people and water education in Haiti is a 
promising opportunity.  This can be accomplished in a few different ways, 
including investments in Haitian educational institutions (supporting 
university courses in water resources management, for example), short-
courses for water sector professionals, and incentives for highly-qualified 
experts to take and stay in government positions.   
As much as capacity building is favored by the donor community, it still 
remains an elusive goal.  It is difficult to quantify or monitor investments in 
human resources and the impacts they might have, and the results can often 
take years or decades to come to fruition.113  Furthermore, building capacity 
runs into a brain drain dilemma for investors: once someone receives 
training and expands their skill-set, they increase their market value and 
may find more lucrative employment elsewhere, thereby negating the 
impact of the original investment.114  This effect can be dampened by 
focusing on building a long-term source for water education (e.g., 
universities), but that approach is less likely to produce the immediate 
impacts donor projects may be looking for.   
Increase Financing.  The Haitian government and foreign donors must 
make budgetary decisions that allocate funds between a myriad of worthy 
sectors and projects.  Ideally each sector would receive funding amounts 
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commensurate with the total needed to create a healthy economy and a 
healthy environment, but that is not always the case.  It may be that the 
Haitian water sector does not have structural or policy issues but simply an 
imbalance between the costs needed to sustainably manage water resources 
and the funding it actually receives.  Costs can incur in the short-term 
(paying staff salaries), while benefits emerge in the long-term (building 
capacity).  Either way, a well-functioning public sector requires financing, 
and injecting more into the water sector would alleviate many concerns. 
Of course, funding is scarce and budget allocations have an opportunity 
cost.  Investing more money in water resources management might mean 
less money for primary education or public healthcare.  The benefits of 
sustainable water resources management confer on future generations, but 
politicians have concerns rooted in the present.  Haiti is by many metrics 
the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere,115 and public funds are 
lacking in many sectors.116  Donors may provide relief but necessarily have 
their own interests to be mindful of.  Finally, there is no guarantee that an 
increased investment in the water sector would lead to a sustainably 
improved environment if other structural issues persist.   
Promote Subsidiarity.  A central tenet of Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) – an emerging and popular water management 
philosophy – is that water management should take place at the lowest 
appropriate governance level (echoing the principle of subsidiarity).  In 
theory, this would place decision-making authority in the hands of 
stakeholders with the most localized knowledge of a particular water 
resource, foster innovation and management tailored to the local 
environment, reduce inefficiencies of national level bureaucracy, reduce 
transboundary conflicts by creating institutions around the boundaries of the 
water resource itself, and encourage local stakeholder involvement.  
Decentralization need not be a zero-sum game in which national level 
ministries lose out either – national administrative agencies are often happy 
to share responsibilities with local governments. 
In practice, however, decentralization can lead to perverse results.117   
Local governments in Haiti are already responsible for a wide variety of 
tasks related to water resources management, and often fail to fulfill those 
obligations.  At the heart of the failure is a lack of financial and human 
resources being dedicated to support local governments in carrying out 
these obligations.  If these entities are not equipped to handle an increase in 
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responsibility, decentralization merely shifts the burden of public 
responsibility from one agency to another.  In Haiti a strong push for 
decentralization must be accompanied by a commensurate increase in 
financial and human support. 
 
A.  Stakeholder Review: Limonade, Haiti, June 16, 2015 
The first stakeholder workshop was conducted at the State University of 
Haiti Limonade campus on June 16, 2015.  The workshop brought together 
four of the five core institutions identified in this study as most crucial to 
ensure successful implementation of a Trou-du-Nord water management 
plan: representatives from the communes, DINEPA, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and Limonade University were in attendance.118  The 
objectives of the workshop were three-fold: 1) to solicit feedback from local 
communities and ministry officials on the preliminary results of the legal 
and institutional framework analysis; 2) to solicit feedback from local 
communities and ministry officials on the preliminary results of the 
institutional capacity assessments; and 3) to initiate the Trou-du-Nord water 
management planning process through direct stakeholder engagement, and 
to lay the foundation for future collaboration.   
Stakeholder feedback can be consolidated into three broad reactions.119  
First, there was general agreement that the conclusions of the legal analysis 
(again, that water governance in Haiti is fragmented across national 
ministries and local governments, and that statutory ambiguities frustrate 
coordination and implementation) are accurate and reflect the realities of 
water governance in Haiti and in the Trou-du-Nord region.  Stakeholders 
expressed frustration that procedures for implementation are not provided 
by implementing legislation or national regulations, while national 
ministries provide little in the way of guidance or capacity support.  Second, 
despite the absence of the Ministry of the Environment, the importance of 
ecosystem services and environmental principles were repeatedly 
mentioned as an important aspect of water management that is currently 
lacking in Haiti.  Finally, when pressed to identify sector-wide reforms that 
would be likely to improve water governance in Haiti, stakeholders 
concentrated on two.  First, the lack of agency capacity was repeatedly 
mentioned as a limiting factor in, and partly responsible for preventing, 
effective water governance.  Second, the creation of a Ministry of Water 
was promoted as a more effective mechanism to consolidate water 
management authority and coordinate the sector.  The feedback from 
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stakeholders largely validates the preliminary research of this study, but 
also suggests that water management planning in the Trou-du-Nord 
watershed should take advantage of the breadth of stakeholder knowledge 
available.   
 
B.  Stakeholder Review: Port au Prince, Haiti, June 18, 2015 
The second stakeholder workshop was conducted in Petionville, on the 
outskirts of Port au Prince, on June 18th 2015.120  The workshop was 
attended by most of the national agencies involved in water management, 
including the Ministries of Agriculture, Environment, Public Works 
(DINEPA), Planning (CIAT), and Economy (UTE).  Given the participation 
of national-level ministry officials, however, this workshop was less 
focused on the Trou-du-Nord watershed area.  Instead, the national 
implications of the legal and institutional research results were prioritized, 
with an eye toward how national policies would have a “downstream” 
impact on local governments tasked with carrying out extensive mandates 
they generally lack the capacity to fulfill. 
Just as stakeholders in the Trou-du-Nord watershed affirmed the 
preliminary results of this study, so too did the representatives from national 
ministries.  However, the points of emphasis diverged somewhat, with 
national ministries placing more emphasis on insufficient capacities (such 
as infrastructure, technology, and experienced staff) rather than incoherent 
or contradictory statutory mandates as a reason for dysfunctional water 
governance in Haiti.  The discussions suggested that national ministries 
adhere more to some policies than to others, and largely adopt their own 
internal priorities (e.g., the Ministry of Agriculture’s Watershed 
Management Policy).  This may be a response to the lack of enforcement or 
coordination in the sector as a whole.  Stakeholders were also concerned 
about their reliance on international NGOs and foreign donors for capacity 
support.  This dynamic is not new in Haiti,121 but it bears consideration that 
self-sufficiency in the water sector is an expressed goal of both donors and 
national ministries.  Regarding potential reforms, the national ministries 
were less enthusiastic about a Ministry of Water than the local governments 
and ministry representatives, but echoed the need for enhanced agency 
capacities. 
 
C.  Suggestions for Further Research 
The results of this water governance study have several implications for 
further research.  This study showed that, on paper, water laws and policies 
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are contradictory and fragment the sector, while isolating local governments 
from resources needed to carry out their mandates in a supposed 
decentralization framework.  In addition, the case study of the Trou-du-
Nord watershed demonstrated that institutional capacities to manage water 
resources sustainably and in an integrated way are limited.  Several lines of 
research extend from these conclusions. 
First, while this study was able to analyze national-level institutions and 
agencies in a general way (e.g., the Ministry of the Environment does not 
sufficient capacity to set and enforce environmental policy), a 
comprehensive and detailed analysis of institutional capacities at the 
national level is needed to broaden understanding of water governance in 
Haiti.  Similarly, this study’s results paint a picture of a dysfunctional water 
sector, but it is not clear if the dysfunction is the result of factors unique to 
the sector, or if cross-cutting governance challenges throughout Haitian 
political life manifest themselves just as well in the water sector.  Most 
likely cross-cutting challenges appear in the sector along with unique 
characteristics that present obstacles to water governance in many countries, 
but ascertaining the primary sources of dysfunction may prove useful to 
future development efforts.  Finally, while this study has investigated the 
laws, institutions, and institutional capacities related to water governance, 
other natural resources have received little research attention to date.  
Coastal resources management, for example, is the focus of several recent 
development projects,122 but a comprehensive assessment of the major 
governance forces shaping coastal zone management is lacking.  
Governance may be the most important element of natural resources 
management, but in Haiti, the most basic questions (What law governs?  
Who is in charge? What is being done?) often go unanswered.  This study 
has attempted to answer some of those questions for water governance, but 
much research and implementation lies ahead.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This study comprised three distinct yet integrated research phases.  In 
the first phase, the legal and institutional analysis paints the picture of a 
water sector in Haiti that is highly fragmented and lacks coordination.  
While some laws are reasonably constituted, many others lack specificity 
with respect to roles and responsibilities.  In addition, many laws do not 
realistically take into account the institutional capacities of national 
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ministries or local governments.  As a result, the legal framework for water 
resources management in Haiti provides insufficient guidance to agencies 
and stakeholders.   
In the second phase, capacity assessments of institutions in the Trou-du-
Nord watershed in northern Haiti demonstrated that local governments and 
agencies have insufficient capacities to carry out complex and integrated 
water resources management activities, with implications for future 
management planning efforts.  Efforts to develop a water management plan 
for the Caracol Industrial Park and the Trou-du-Nord watershed, in 
particular, should account for the existing capacities of institutions in the 
region by tailoring the plan’s stakeholder participation and capacity 
building strategies.   
In the last phase, stakeholder workshops were conducted in the Trou-du-
Nord watershed and in Port-au-Prince to  validate the preliminary results of 
this study and solicit additional insights.  The workshops made clear that 
while institutional capacities are low, stakeholders have a keen awareness of 
the limitations of those institutions.  At both the national and watershed 
level, government representatives acknowledged that water governance in 
Haiti is sorely underdeveloped, while pressing for more engagement and 
research from the international community. The goal of this study was to 
contribute to the emerging body of research on the Haitian water sector in 
order to promote development and reform.  While water governance in Haiti 
remains a challenge, this study hopes to have painted a clearer picture of the 
landscape and its obstacles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
